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OF STUDENTS' RIGHTS AND HONOR: THE
APPLICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT'S DUE PROCESS STRICTURES TO
HONOR CODE PROCEEDINGS AT PRIVATE
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
H.L. SILETS*
I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society, but the
people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is, not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion by education.
-Thomas Jefferson'
I. INTRODUCTION
Honor codes at institutions of higher learning long have been a
source of controversy. Disputes over honor codes generally involve
their supposed ineffectiveness or their lack of requisite procedural due
process as prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 2 While these disputes are not new, a recent ele-
ment that has changed the tenor of debate over honor codes has been
the increased willingness of the judicial system to review honor code
proceedings and judgments.
Not until recently have the courts been willing to enter a domain
that was once the peculiar province of academicians and administrators.
Final "appellate" review of cases involving alleged honor code viola-
tions historically rested with college or university presidents. These "fi-
nal arbitors" of honor code proceedings were probably just as capable
of making biased and perfunctory decisions as they were of impartial
and fair judgments. Woodrow Wilson, for example, as president of
Princeton University, was forced to render a decision in such a case early
in this century.3 A student was expelled for violating Princeton's honor
* A.B., magna cur laude, Princeton University, 1984. J.D. candidate, Northwestern
University School of Law, 1987. The author gratefully acknowledges the advice of Profes-
sor Victor G. Rosenblum of the Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William CharlesJarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprinted
in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 278 (1903)(emphasis added).
2. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its juridiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. See Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D.N.J.
19 85 )(quoting G. SMITH, WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED - THE LAST YEARS OF WOODROW
WILSON 28 (1964)).
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code by cheating on an exam:
[H]is mother came to plead for his reinstatement with the man
who passed upon the expulsion. She said she was undergoing
serious medical treatments and that the shock of having her
boy expelled might well bring those treatments to naught. The
answer was, 'Madam, you force me to say a hard thing, but if I
had to choose between your life or my life or anybody's life and
the good of this college, I should choose the good of the col-
lege.' But he could eat nothing at luncheon that day.
4
More recently, Princeton's honor code was reviewed and upheld by
the United States District Court of New Jersey as being fundamentally
fair, and thus, implicitly constitutional. 5 The court noted, however, that
this decision would by no means "put to rest the heated debate engen-
dered by this and other incidents where long established honor systems
have been attacked." ' 6 The court went on to say that "[p]ublic opinion
on the subject naturally runs the entire gamut from the cynical to the
reverential."
'7
Indeed, honor codes have been simultaneously attacked and
praised. For example, Millard H. Rudd, the Executive Director of the
Association of American Law Schools, recently characterized honor
codes as "a realistic preparation for the real world." 8 He also stated that
educators "have a responsibility to seek to bring out the best of people
and not to encourage the worst or to assume the worst." 9 Others, such
as author and former West Point instructor Joseph J. Ellis, have criti-
cized honor code systems, noting that "[w]e don't live in a world in
which there exists a single definition of honor any more, and it's a fool
that hangs on to the traditional standards and hopes that the world will
come around to him."' 0 Thus, the general debate over honor codes
remains heated and energetic and is not likely to subside soon.
In recent years, honor codes have become a major focus of atten-
tion both within and without the academic community I due to the in-
creasing number of suits brought by students against institutions of
higher learning 12 charging particular honor code systems with funda-
4. Id.
5. Id. at 413.
6. Id. at 415.
7. id.
8. Does the Honor System Encourage Cheating?, 8 PA. L.J. REP. 18 (1985)(emphasis in
original).
9. Id.
10. See Cheating Prompts Air Force to Halt Cadet Honor Boards, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984,
at I, col. 3; see also Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D.N.J.
1985).
11. See, e.g., Princeton Is Upheld in Case Challenging Its Honor Code, N.Y. Times, May 7,
1985, at 11, col. 3; Princeton's Honor Code Challenged by Student, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at
B4, col. 1; Cheating Prompts Air Force to Halt Cadet Honor Boards, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984,
at 1, col. 3; Plagiarism in the Ivy, N.J.L.J., July 1, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
12. See Thigpen, The Application of Fourteenth Amendment Norms to Private Colleges and Uni-
versities, II J. LAw & EDuc. 171, 207 (1982), wherein it is stated that "there has been a




mental unfairness13 and with violations of students' fourteenth amend-
ment rights to due process. 14 Some educators have viewed with alarm
this "specter ... of a rash of court cases challenging decisions in areas
that were once considered the educational world's peculiar province."15
Others believe that "student utilization of the peaceful processes of the
courts is in many instances to be encouraged rather than criticized."'
16
This article will argue that judicial review of honor code proceed-
ings provides a needed check on institutional actions that otherwise
might become summary, perfunctory and insufficient. This article also
will argue that judicial review is especially appropriate with regard to
honor code proceedings at private colleges and universities which, un-
like state institutions, usually are not thought to be subject to the scru-
tiny of the courts. While it may be argued that the wisdom and
experience of administrators and academicians may provide a primary
safeguard against summary dismissals and punishments, "experience
has taught ... the necessity of auxiliary precautions."' 7 In the world of
academia, therefore, one important "auxiliary precaution" can and
should be judicial enforcement of due process in honor code proceed-
ings that involve disciplinary offenses.
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO PRIVATE
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
In order to determine whether honor codes deprive students who
attend non-public institutions of higher education of the due process
protections of the fourteenth amendment, 18 the first stage of inquiry
should focus on whether the fourteenth amendment is applicable to the
regulations and proceedings of private colleges and universities.' 9 Pub-
lic colleges and universities, which are considered instruments of state
government, 20 are not beyond the reach of the due process requirement
13. See, e.g., Clayton, 608 F. Supp. 413; Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 519 F.
Supp. 802 (D.N.J. 1981); Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 49 N.Y.2d 652, 404 N.E.2d 1302,
427 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1980).
14. See, e.g., Henson v. Honor Comm. 719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983);Jaksa v. Regents of
Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986);
Harvey v. Palmer College of Chiropractic, 363 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Univer-
sity of Houston v. Sabeti, 676 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
15. Perkins, The University and Due Process, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Vol. II, No. 8, 5
(Dec. 21, 1967).
16. Byse, The University and Due Process. A Somewhat Different View, 54 AM. Ass'N UNIV.
PROFESSORS BULL. 143, 147 (1968).
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 337 (A. Hamilton, J. Madison) (Nat'l Home Library
Found. ed. 1938).
18. See supra note 2.
19. See, e.g, Thigpen, supra note 12; Wilkinson and Rolapp, The Private College and Stu-
dent Discipline, 56 A.B.A.J. 121 (1970); Comment, An Overview: The Private University and Due
Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795; Comment, A Student's Right to Hearing on Dismissalfrom a Univer-
sity, 10 STAN. L. REV. 746 (1958) [hereinafter Comment, A Student's Right]; Comment, Com-
mon Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120
(1974).
20. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (wherein the Court noted that
"[bly and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and
local authorities."); see also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.)
1987]
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of the fourteenth amendment.2 1 In dealing with private universities, on
the other hand, courts have been more reluctant to extend due process
guarantees to students because of a perceived lack of state action. 22 In
fact, students at private universities not only have been treated differ-
ently from students at public universities, but, in at least one case, stu-
dents attending the same university were not granted equal protection
by the courts merely because some students were enrolled in the "pri-
vate" college of the same university, even though the two colleges were
located on the same campus and administered by the same personnel.
23
Students and legal scholars have criticized the courts' posture of
denying judicial protection to private university students in the honor
code context. 2 4 Others, however, believe that courts have extended the
state action doctrine too far, and that the fourteenth amendment should
be used only in cases involving direct governmental action.2 5 The in-
creasing commentary and awareness of the due process rights of stu-
dents at private colleges and universities has led to the development of
several theories which courts have used to apply the fourteenth amend-
ment to non-public institutions of higher education. In order to assess
fully the constitutional obligations of private colleges and universities, it
is necessary to examine these theories.
(state university), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp.
356 (S.D.N.Y.) (public high school), rev'don other grounds, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). In Madera, and in Dixon, the courts established that public
secondary schools and state universities come under the state action doctrine as instru-
mentalities of state government. Madera, 267 F. Supp. at 369; Dixon, 294 F.2d at 156-57.
See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 543, 423 A.2d 615, 619 (1980) (citations omitted),
appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982), wherein the Supreme Court of NewJersey stated that
"[a] public college or university, created or controlled by the state itself, is an arm of state
government and, thus, by definition, implicates state action."
21. The Supreme Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969), that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate." See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
180 (1972). Although Tinker concentrated on the first amendment rights of students,
other courts have construed due process as equally applicable to all constitutional protec-
tions. See, e.g., Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707, 709 (6th Cir.)(equal protec-
tion found applicable), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1973). It also has been held that students
do not forfeit their constitutional rights by attending a state university. Esteban v. Central
Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
22. See Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 995 (1976); Spark v. Catholic Univ., 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(per
curiam); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974);
Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Blackburn v. Fisk Univ.,
443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La.
1962); Swanson v. Wesley College, 402 A.2d 401 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979); see also Note, Due
Process and the University Student: The Academic/Disciplinary Dichotomy, 37 LA. L. REV. 939, 940
(1977), wherein it was stated that "courts have been more reluctant to extend due process
guarantees to private university students than to public university students."
23. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
24. See, e.g., Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 MiCH. L. REV. 393 (1971);
Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DEN. L.J. 582, 612-13 (1968); Comment,
Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE LJ.
120, 122 (1974).
25. See G. GUNTHER, CONsTrrTUnONAL LAw, 972-1030 (1980); Note, State Action: Theo-
ries for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity. 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974).
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A. The State Action Requirement and the State Action Tests
In the landmark case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,2 6 the
United States Supreme Court stated that significant state involvement in
the affairs of private organizations would subject those organizations to
constitutional restrictions such as due process. Specifically, the Court
held that state action exists when
[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interde-
pendence with [the acting party] that it must be recognized as a
joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that ac-
count, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as
to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 7
While the Court in Burton did not explain how much state participa-
tion was necessary for state action to exist,2 8 it stated in a subsequent
decision, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,29 that Burton stood for the
proposition that any private organization was subject to fourteenth
amendment limitations whenever there was a "symbiotic relationship"
between the acting party and the state.
30
In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that state action also may exist
when the state becomes sufficiently involved in the challenged activity. 3 '
The Court suggested that in considering the state action issue, the ques-
tion is "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and
the challenged action of the ... entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."'3 2 The Court, therefore, rea-
soned that the plaintiff must show government involvement in the spe-
cific act at issue such that the government has effectively granted its
approval or put its weight behind the action.3 3 Yet, the government's
mere acquiescence or approval of the private action will not convert the
26. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
27. Id. at 725.
28. In Burton, plaintiffs alleged that the Wilmington Parking Authority, a state entity,
was responsible for the racially discriminatory practices of a privately owned coffee shop
located in a building owned by the Authority. Although the Delaware Supreme Court
found the discrimination to be purely private in character, the United States Supreme
Court held that the state was significantly involved in the infringement of rights protected
by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 724.
29. 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 350-56. Jackson concerned a privately owned and operated electric power
company. The plaintiff alleged a violation of due process when the utility terminated her
service without notice, hearing, or any opportunity to pay the past due amounts. The
Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was not sufficiently involved
in the challenged activity to convert it into state action, despite the government's delega-
tion of monopoly power to the electric company. The company, therefore, was under no
constitutional duty to observe procedural due process when terminating a customer's
service.
32. 419 U.S. at 351.
33. Id. at 357; see also Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589, 597
(2d Cir. 1979) (without the intimate involvement by the state in the private act, there is
insufficient nexus between state and private activity to warrant a finding of state action),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
1987]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
act into that of the government.3 4
Indeed, the government can be held responsible for a private act
only when it has compelled the act by law,3 5 or when it has "exercised
coercive power or ... provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
[government]." 3 6 In Blum v. Yaretsky,3 7 for example, the Court specifi-
cally rejected the contention that state licensing and funding converts
private action into state action:
As we have previously held, privately owned enterprises pro-
viding services that the State would not necessarily provide...
do not fall within the ambit of [the state action requirement].
That programs undertaken by the State result in substantial
funding of the activities of a private entity is no more persua-
sive than the fact of regulation of such an entity in demonstrat-
ing that the State is responsible for decisions made by the
entity in the course of its business.
3 8
In addition to the previously enunciated "symbiotic relationship"
and "close nexus" tests, the Supreme Court discussed the "public func-
tion" test in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.3 9 and again in Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn.40 Under the"public function" test, government action may be
present where the function performed by a private entity is "tradition-
ally the exclusive prerogative of the State.' 4 1 The private performance
of a function that serves the public or which is "affected with a public
interest" does not suffice as a "public function" under this test. 42 The
logic of Rendell-Baker and Blum is that state contributions to otherwise
private entities, no matter how great those contributions may be, will
not of themselves transform a private actor into a state actor. Rather,
the activity must be one which is traditionally associated with
sovereignty.
43
In summary, state action may be found to exist where: (1) a private
34. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357;
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978).
35. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164; see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170
(1970). The Adickes Court noted that "[w]hen the State has commanded a particular result,
it has saved to itself the power to determine that result and thereby to a 'significant extent'
has 'become involved' in it." Id. (quoting Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248
(1963)).
36. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
37. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
38. Id. at 1011 (citations omitted).
39. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
40. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
41. Id. at 842 (quotingJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
42. Id. at 841;Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353-54.
43. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353. The "public function" test has been applied basically in
three different situations: first, when the government, after performing a particular func-
tion, attempts to avoid its constitutional obligations by transferring the function to a pri-
vate entity, see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); second, in cases involving the
exercise of powers, such as the supervision of elections that are almost always carried out
by government, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); and third, in the first amendment
context, to determine if private property is the functional equivalent of a municipality, see
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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entity possesses a "symbiotic relationship" with the state; (2) there ex-
ists a "close nexus" between the state and the challenged conduct; or
(3) the private actor is performing a "public function" that traditionally
has been exercised exclusively by the government. With respect to the
state action doctrine, the Supreme Court also noted in Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority44 that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
be attributed its true significance." '4 5 In Burton, the Court concluded
that the racially discriminatory policies of a restaurant that leased space
in a public parking facility constituted state action after first examining
such factors as public ownership of the land and building, and public
maintenance of the building. 46 By sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances, the Court therefore determined that "[a]ddition of all these ac-
tivities, obligations and responsibilities . . . [and] the benefits mutually
conferred . . . indicates that degree of state participation and involve-
ment in discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth
Amendment to condemn."
'4 7
It follows, then, that in reviewing a claim by private university stu-
dents for procedural due process protection in honor code proceedings,
a court must invoke one of the three aforementioned theories of state
action. In applying the fourteenth amendment to private colleges and
universities, Judge J. Skelly Wright has observed:
At the outset one may question whether any school or college
can ever be so 'private' as to escape the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment.... No one any longer doubts that education is a
matter affected with the greatest public interest. And this is
true whether it is offered by a public or private institution.
Clearly the administrators of a private college are performing a
public function. They do the work of the state, often in the
place of the state .... And, if so, are they not then agents of the
state, subject to the constitutional restraints on governmental
action ? ...48
Judge Wright's legal argument proposed that the performance of
44. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
45. Id. at 722.
46. See supra note 28.
47. 365 U.S. at 724.
48. Guillory v. Admininistrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 858-59 (E.D. La.),
rev'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962)(citations omitted)(footnote omitted). In Guillory, suit
was brought to compel Tulane University to admit qualified black applicants. Petitioner
claimed that because the educational function performed by the university was govern-
mental in nature, the school was thereby subject to the due process strictures of the four-
teenth amendment. Thus, based upon the "public function" theory and various factors
that established an ongoing and substantial relationship between Tulane and the state of
Louisiana, see infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text, Judge Wright ruled that Tulane
could not continue to practice racial segregation because the exclusion of blacks contra-
vened the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Judge Wright's decision
was later overturned, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962), and on a subsequent hearing was held
to be immune from fourteenth amendment restrictions, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
See Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in Private Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 39, 50 (1967);
Thigpen, supra note 12 at 184-85.
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the educational process is, in and of itself, sufficient to constitute state
action due to its nature as a public function. Yet, it should be empha-
sized that Judge Wright's opinion in Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane
University4 9 did not rest solely on a "public function" theory. Indeed,
the record in Guillory revealed a variety of factors that established an
ongoing and substantial relationship between Tulane University and the
State of Louisiana.
5 0
Under this "public function" analysis, then, it follows that as college
educations become more necessary and as private school dependence
upon government financial support increases, courts will find it corre-
spondingly more difficult to refuse to measure the private university's
actions by fourteenth amendment standards. 5 1 Used as the sole basis
for finding state action in cases involving non-public institutions of
higher learning, the "public function" theory almost uniformly has been
rejected by the courts. 52 Nevertheless, many of the courts that have re-
jected the "public function" theory have not described explicitly
whether they rejected the argument because in their opinion education
is not a public function, or rather, because although education is a pub-
lic function, it still is not sufficient for state action to exist. Regardless of
how the courts may interpret the "public function" theory, there re-
49. 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 1984)(pri-
vate universities' interdependence with state interpreted as a "symbiotic relationship"),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2018 (1985); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 958-
59 (3d Cir. 1977)(state action found where state deeply enmeshed in operations of private
university); see also Harvey v. Palmer College of Chiropractic, 363 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa App.
1984) (common law imposes due process requirements that parallel the fourteenth amend-
ment). But see Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 559-60 (D.C. Cir.)(lack
of government role in university management precluded state action), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
995 (1975); Spark v. Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(no
state action found where statute authorizing funds prohibited state control over univer-
sity); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973)(outright grant of
fraction of cost of education does not make school an agent of the state); Jansen v. Emory
Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ga. 1977)(constitutional due process not guaranteed by
private school bulletin dismissal procedures guaranteeing "due process"), aff'd, 579 F.2d
45 (5th Cir. 1978); Swanson v. Wesley College, Inc., 402 A.2d 401, 403 (Del. Super. Ct.
1979)(performance of a public function by private university not state action without sig-
nificant involvement in decision-making process).
52. Krohn v. Harvard Law School, 552 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1977); Berrios v. Inter
American Univ., 535 F.2d 1330, 1333 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 942 (1976);
Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 995 (1976); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1140 (2d Cir. 1973);
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968); Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple
Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp.
494,499 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 1973);
Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598, 606 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 439 F.2d 773
(4th Cir. 1971); see Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 546
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La.
1962). But see Hall v. Medical College of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1984)("Provid-
ing facilities and opportunities for the pursuit of higher education is a long-recognized govern-
mental function")(emphasis added), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 796 (1985); Buckton v.
N.C.A.A., 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. Mass. 1973)(Boston University, "though a private
institution, clearly performs functions governmental in nature, such as providing higher
education to and exercising substantial dominion over its students"); Belk v. Chancellor of
Washington Univ., 336 F. Supp. 45, 48 (E.D. Mo. 1970)("Education is a public function").
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mains little judicial authority for the proposition that education in pri-
vate institutions, particularly at the college and university level, is a
governmental function.5 3 Thus, while some courts have been willing to
find state action for purposes of applying the due process clause to pri-
vate colleges and universities; 54 traditionally, the rights accorded stu-
dents have been analyzed in terms of contractual relationships. 5 5
B. The Contract Theory of the Student-Private University Relationship
The contract theory for assessing the student-university relation-
ship presumes that by applying to a private university and paying tuition
upon admission, the student agrees to abide by university regulations,
normally specified in the university's catalogue or bulletin. 56 The stu-
dent's knowledge of and agreement to conform to the university's regu-
lations is generally implied. 5 7 Thus, under this type of analysis, the
student's rights are determined by the express and implied provisions of
the student-university contract.
58
Despite the facility of viewing the relationship of a private college or
university to its students in contractual terms, the courts have warned
against a rigid application of the law of contracts. For example, in
Slaughter v. Brigham Young University,59 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit stated that:
It is apparent that some elements of the law of contracts are used
and should be used in the analysis of the relationship between
plaintiff and the University .... This does not mean that 'con-
53. Perhaps the courts eventually will accept the view that in a democracy, education
is an essential undertaking for which government has a direct responsibility. As Thomas
Jefferson so eloquently noted almost two centuries ago:
Education is . . . placed among the articles of public care, not that it would be
proposed to take its ordinary branches out of the hands of private enterprise,
which manages so much better all the concerns to which it is equal; but a public
institution can alone supply those sciences which, though rarely called for, are yet
necessary to complete the circle, all the parts of which contribute to the improve-
ment of the country, and some of them to its preservation.
T. JEFFERSON, selected writings, in THE LIVING THOUGHTS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (J.
Dewey, ed. 1940)(emphasis added). Thus, while higher education has not been viewed by
many courts as a public function, some courts have found private colleges and universities
subject to the constitutional restraints of the fourteenth amendment based on all forms of
state action.
54. See Comment, A Student's Right, supra note 19. For cases involving expulsions from
private organizations, see Rutledge v. Gulian, 93 N.J. 113, 459 A.2d 680 (1983); Higgins v.
American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968).
55. See Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 519 F. Supp. 802, 806 (D.N.J. 1981);
Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 49 N.Y.2d 652, 658, 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1305, 427 N.Y.S.2d
760, 763 (1980).
56. See, e.g.,John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924)(relation-
ship between student and private institution is purely contractual); Samson v. Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)(discussing implied terms of
contract between private university and student), af'd, 181 A.D. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125
(1917); see also Nordin, The Contract to Educate. Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-
University Relationship, 8J. C. & U.L. 14 (1981-82).
57. Comment, Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities, 5
WILLIAMETrE L.J. 277, 278 (1969).
58. See Comment, A Student's Right, supra note 19, at 746.
59. 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975).
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tract law' must be rigidly applied in all its aspects, nor is it so
applied even when the contract analogy is extensively
adopted.... The student-university relationship is unique, and
it should not be and cannot be stuffed into one doctrinal
category.
60
In applying traditional contract principles to the relationship be-
tween a private college or university and its students, one court has held
that the relevant terms of the college-student contract found in a school
enrollment agreement did not apply to an expelled student because the
contract was silent as to any refund in the event of a student's dismissal.
In King v. American Academy of Dramatic Arts,6 1 the court held that a stu-
dent was not contractually bound by a provision of the Academy's en-
rollment agreement regarding the refundability of the student's tuition
because the contract merely outlined tuition refund procedures in the
event of a student's early voluntary withdrawal rather than a student's
involuntary dismissal. The court reasoned that
to the extent that the enrollment agreement would allow the
Academy to dismiss a student with legal justification and also
retain his payments ... such agreement [is] unconscionable in
the substantive sense in light of the agreement's one sidedness,
the absolute discretion it purports to give the Academy, and the
fact that a hearing was not necessary prior to dismissal.
6 2
The court's refusal to apply to a student that was expelled a school
enrollment agreement that did not mention tuition refunds in the event
of student dismissals has alerted administrators of the necessity of ex-
plicitly stating information that the school considers vital in documents
that encompass the definition of the university's contractual
obligation.
6 3
By analogy, a court, willing to demand that a private university or
college provide each student with reasonable notice regarding the re-
60. Id. at 626 (emphasis in original).
61. 102 Misc. 2d 1111, 425 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
62. Id. at 1113, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 507. See also Abrams v. Illinois Podiatric Medicine, 77
Ill. App. 3d 471, 395 N.E.2d 1061 (1979)(a statement in a private college bulletin stating
the desirability of informing a student of his progress does not create a binding obliga-
tion); Drucker v. New York Univ., 57 Misc 2d 937, 293 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. Civ. 1968)(a
student was not contractually bound by a provision in a university bulletin regarding the
refundability of a registration fee because a student reasonably could not have been ex-
pected to read carefully terms buried within school application, catalogues or registration
forms), rev'd, 59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (N.Y. App. Term 1969).
63. A number of courts have found that a single document such as a university cata-
logue or bulletin does not contain the entire definition of the university's contractual obli-
gation and have listed other sources that help define that duty. For example, in Ross v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 150 (M.D. Pa. 1978), the federal district court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania referred to the University bulletin, the "Procedures
for Graduate Students & Faculty Resolution of Graduate Student Problems," the Manual
for Graduate Students, The Constitution and By-Laws and Standing Rules of the Faculty
Senate, and "Policies and Rules for Students, 1975-1976." In Olsson v. Board of Higher
Educ., 66 A.D.2d 196, 412 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1979), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 408, 426 N.Y.S.2d 248,
402 N.E.2d 1150 (1980), the court found that a professor's statements regarding examina-
tion criteria created contractual terms. Moreover, the court in Pride v. Howard Univ., 384
A.2d 31 (D.C. 1978), found the customary disciplinary practices in force at the time of a
student's admission to be incorporated into the student-university contract.
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turn of tuition fees, should be even more insistent that the university
furnish each student the same type of reasonable notice of the standards
of conduct and academic performance that are to control his educational
career.
In summary, based upon the state action and contract theories of
the student-university relationship, courts should accord to private col-
lege and university students substantially the same procedural safe-
guards that the fourteenth amendment requires public universities to
afford their students. Reasonable notice of specific rules and fair proce-
dures, especially with regard to honor codes, will inform students pre-
cisely of their obligations and perhaps will convince them of the validity
and desirability of enforcement by a systematized and ordered
procedure.
III. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Assuming a court finds that the due process protections of the four-
teenth amendment apply to the honor code regulations and proceedings
of a private college or university, the next step is to determine whether
the particular student infraction at issue is academic or disciplinary in
nature. This determination is critical because of two United States
Supreme Court decisions that established a dichotomy between the due
process required in cases involving disciplinary dismissals and the due
process required in cases involving academic dismissals.
In Goss v. Lopez,6 4 the Court established due process guarantees ap-
plicable to students who are facing temporary disciplinary dismissal
from a public school. After finding that a temporary suspension from
high school implicates a protected interest, and recognizing that the dis-
ciplinary process is not a totally accurate, unerring process,6 5 the Court
held that a student facing temporary, disciplinary suspension "must be
given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." 66
Three years later, in Board of Curators v. Horowitz,6 7 the Supreme
Court held that there is no requirement of even an informal hearing
when an applicant is facing dismissal for academic cause. 68 In differenti-
64. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). In Goss, the question before the Court concerned the rights
of students to some kind of procedural due process before being disciplined by a ten-day
suspension for misconduct at school.
65. Id. at 579-80. The Court noted that in disciplinary proceedings school authorities
must frequently depend on the reports and advice of others, and that the nature of the
conduct involved and the factual conclusions of the school authorities are often subject to
dispute. Id. Thus, disciplinary suspensions sufficiently resemble traditional judicial and
administrative factfinding so as to require a hearing before school authorities.
66. Id. at 579 (emphasis in original). A student facing temporary disciplinary suspen-
sion is entitled to "[o]ral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies
them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present
his side of the story." Id. at 581.
67. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
68. Id. at 90. In Horowitz, the Court was faced with a situation where a medical student
in her final year was dismissed from the school because of an unsatisfactory academic per-
formance. Without deciding the issue of the existence of a liberty or property interest, the
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ating between the failure of a student to meet academic standards and
the alleged violation by a student of valid rules of conduct, the majority
concluded that:
Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast to disciplinary
determinations, bear little resemblance to the judicial and ad-
ministrative factfinding proceedings to which we have tradition-
ally attached a full-hearing requirement .... Like the decision
of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student
in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student
for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumula-
tive information and is not readily adapted to the procedural
tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.
69
The Horowitz Court distinguished Goss, which involved a disciplinary
proceeding, by finding that when disputable conduct was implicated, a
hearing would "provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous ac-
tion." 70 Such a hearing, however, would not accomplish the same ob-
jective in an academic dismissal. 7 1 The Court stated that academic
judgments are more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual
questions presented in average disciplinary proceedings, 72 thus justify-
ing the differing degrees of procedural due process warranted in aca-
demic versus disciplinary suspensions.
Justice Marshall, in his separate opinion, criticized the majority's
finding in Horowitz that an academic dismissal warrants a lesser due pro-
cess standard than that required in Goss.73 Justice Marshall determined
that the dismissal, though characterized as "academic" by the majority,
was in fact conduct-related, as was the infraction in Goss,74 and con-
cluded that in cases concerning dismissal, a "reliance on labels should
not be a substitute for sensitive consideration of the procedures re-
quired by due process."
75
The Supreme Court recently reinforced its position of deference to
college or university administrators when academic dismissals are at is-
sue. In Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,7 6 Justice Stevens,
writing for a unanimous Court, stated that "[w]hen judges are asked to
review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one,
they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judg-
Court found that the student had been awarded at least as much due process as the four-
teenth amendment required since she had been fully informed of the faculty's dissatisfac-
tion with her clinical progress and since the ultimate decision to dismiss the student was
careful and deliberate.
69. Id. at 89-90.
70. Id. at 89 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975)).
71. Id. at 89-90.
72. Id. at 90.
73. Id. at 98-103 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Id. at 99. Justice Marshall stated that the reasons given for the student's dismissal
in Horowitz - personal hygiene and peer and patient relationships - were not at all aca-
demic. Id. at 104 n.17.
75. Id at 106.
76. 106 S. Ct. 507 (1985); see also High Court Upholds Dismissal of Medical Student, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1985, at 15, col. 4.
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ment. ' ' 77 Justice Stevens stated that the courts were ill-equipped to
"evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are
made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions - deci-
sions that require 'an expert evaluation of cumulative information and
[are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or adminis-
trative decisionmaking.' "78
In Ewing, however, the Court left open the possibility that a student
who could prove that he was arbitrarily dismissed from a state univer-
sity, albeit for academic reasons, might prevail in a suit seeking redress
for a violation of his constitutional rights. The Court said that such a
suit would succeed only if the dismissal was "such a substantial depar-
ture from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the faculty
did not exercise professional judgment." 7 9 Justice Powell, in a concur-
ring opinion, restated Justice Marshall's admonition of the Horowitz ma-
jority that judicial review of academic decisions "is rarely appropriate,
particularly where orderly administrative procedures are followed." 80
The kind of due process that will be required and the willingness of
the courts to afford judicial review, therefore, depends upon whether
the student infraction at issue is categorized as either academic or disci-
plinary. A student's violation of a school's honor code poses a special
problem since honor code violations often involve allegations of cheat-
ing.8 ' Cheating is an offense that the courts have not characterized
neatly as either "academic" or "disciplinary."
While the courts for the most part have not reached the issue of
whether to classify cheating offenses as academic or disciplinary in na-
ture, in Jaksa v. Regents of the University of Michigan,8 2 the United States
District Court for the District of Michigan determined that cheating
should be treated as a disciplinary matter.8 3 TheJaksa court held that
dismissals for cheating were similar to disciplinary dismissals in that
both categories primarily involved the resolution of factual disputes as
opposed to academic dismissals which generally concern "a judgment
[that] is by its nature more subjective and evaluative."18 4 The court rea-
soned that dismissal for cheating "requires greater procedural protec-
tion than academic dismissals since the former are more stigmatizing
than the latter, and may have a greater impact on a student's future."8 5
While this point is arguable, student dismissals for cheating, if classified
77. 106 S. Ct. at 513; see also Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 96 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. 106 S. Ct. at 514 (quoting Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 89-90).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 516 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. See, e.g., Henson v. Honor Comm., 719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983); Clayton v. Trust-
ees of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413 (D.N.J. 1985); Bleicker v. Board of Trustees, 485
F. Supp. 1381 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
82. 597 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aft'd, 787 F.2d 590 (1986).
83. Id at 1248 n.2. But see Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir.
1984)(cheating on an exam considered "clearly an academic matter" by university).
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as academic, will not require even an informal hearing based upon the
Supreme Court's holding in Horowitz. Thus, if the courts wish to require
private colleges and universities to create honor codes that establish
specific rules and fair procedures, then honor code violations involving
cheating must be considered disciplinary rather than academic in order
to satisfy the mandates of Horowitz and Ewing.
The majority of cases concerning honor code proceedings at both
private and public colleges and universities implicitly recognize cheating
as a disciplinary offense, and thus, unlike an academic offense, one that
is subject to judicial scrutiny.8 6 While the courts generally have not dis-
cussed the reasons for designating cheating as a disciplinary infrac-
tion,8 7 the courts seem to look to the nature of the hearing and
punishment involved in order to determine the nature of the violation at
issue. For example, in Clayton v. Trustees of Princeton University,88 the
United States District Court of New Jersey stated that "Princeton justifi-
ably views cheating as a serious offense against the standards of its aca-
demic community which is worthy of serious punishment."8 9 The court
held that if a material breach of Princeton's disciplinary procedures
could be shown, then relief would be granted to Robert Clayton, the
Princeton student who brought action against the University for alleged
improprieties in the disciplinary proceedings that led to his suspension.
The Clayton court concluded that because "the value of [a Princeton Uni-
versity] degree is impaired by the presence of a notation of disciplinary
suspension on the academic transcript", 90 the student's interest was sub-
stantial enough to warrant judicial review of Princeton's honor code
procedures.
In general, then, the courts seemingly do not inspect the inherent
nature of the infraction in question, but rather, prefer to examine the
underlying purposes of the college or university proceeding that is at
issue. If the purposes of the proceeding are to determine whether or
not a student violated an institution's honor code, and then to discipline
the student for this infraction, the courts will treat the violation as disci-
plinary in nature, and therefore, subject to judicial review.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS TO HONOR CODE
REGULATIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
Once it is determined that the fourteenth amendment's due process
protections apply to private university honor code infractions, a court
86. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Hall v. Medical College of
Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 796 (1985); see also Jones v.
Board of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 704 F.2d 713 (4th Cir.)(specifies process due), aff'g,
557 F. Supp. 263 (W.D.N.C. 1983); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 621 F. Supp. 948 (M.D. Ala.
1985)(discusses procedural due process requirements in disciplinary cases); Clayton v.
Trustees of Princeton Univ., 519 F. Supp. 802 (D.N.J. 1981)(discusses role of court in
disciplinary proceedings).
87. But seeJaksa, 597 F. Supp. at 1248 n.2.
88. 519 F. Supp. 802 (D.N.J. 1981).
89. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
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then must decide how to adapt the fourteenth amendment's due process
strictures to the regulations and proceedings of a school's honor code.
As the Supreme Court stated in Morrissey v. Brewer,9 1 "[o]nce it is deter-
mined that due process applies, the question remains what process is
due."'92 Over thirty years ago, Justice Frankfurter discussed the ideal of
due process in terms still applicable today:
93
'[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and cir-
cumstances. . . . '[Djue process' cannot be imprisoned within
the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a
profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more
particularly between the individual and government, "due pro-
cess" is compounded of history, reason, the past course of deci-
sions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic
faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instru-
ment. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate pro-
cess of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of
judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the
unfolding of the process.
94
As Justice Frankfurter clearly states, the due process required by the
Constitution is only that process which is "due" in light of the circum-
stances and interests of the parties involved. The fundamental require-
ments of procedural due process are merely "notice and an opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 95 The concept of
due process does not require that every dispute between a student and a
university be resolved in the same manner or follow the judicial
model. 96 Rather, due process allows for many different methods of dis-
pute resolution as long as the method used provides reasonable notice
and a fair hearing.
9 7
The Supreme Court has articulated three factors for consideration
in determining what process is due in a particular setting: 1) the "private
interest that will be affected by the official action;" 2) the risk of "errone-
ous deprivation" of that interest by procedures currently in force,
weighed against the value of "additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards;" and 3) the "Government's interest," including the function in-
volved and the financial and administrative constraints that additional or
91. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
92. Id. at 481.
93. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)(Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
94. Id. at 162-63; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
95. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), quoted in Goss,
419 U.S. at 579; see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)(time and
nature of hearing depend on appropriate accommodation of competing interests); Mackey
v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979)(Stewart, J., dissenting)(dimension of prior hearing varies
with nature of case); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)(due process "must be tailored
to the capacities and circumstances" of the parties involved).
96. Goss, 419 U.S. at 578 (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)).
97. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976).
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substitute procedures would create. 98 The Supreme Court also has rec-
ognized that the due process requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment may be satisfied by something less than a trial-like proceeding. 99
In Goss v. Lopez '0 0 for example, the Court held that in order to sus-
pend a high school student for ten days, he must be "given an opportu-
nity to explain his version of the facts . . . [after being] told what he is
accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is." 10 l The Court,
however, made it clear that its holding was limited to short suspensions,
and that "[lIonger suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the
school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures."'
10 2
As to the formality of the requisite hearing, the Court declared that:
The presence of attorneys or the imposition of rigid rules of
cross-examination at a hearing for a student.., would serve no
useful purpose, notwithstanding that the dismissal in question
may be of permanent duration. But an 'informal give-and-take'
between the student and the administrative body dismissing
him - and foreclosing his opportunity to gain admission at all
comparable institutions - would not unduly burden the educa-
tional process and would, at least, give the student 'the oppor-
tunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems
the proper context.'
0 3
The recommendations as to what kind of notice and hearing is re-
quired under the due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment
were more explicitly set forth in the famous case of Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education.'0 4 In Dixon, students were expelled from Alabama
State College for disciplinary reasons. 10 5 After holding that due process
requires a state university to give its students notice and the opportunity
to be heard, 10 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
articulated standards for the nature of the requisite notice and hearing.
The court said that a notice should "contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion."' 1 7 In
discussing the hearing requirement, the court emphasized that the facts
and circumstances surrounding each case were to be considered in de-
termining the elements required in a hearing. When misconduct rather
than academic failure is the subject of the hearing, the court said that
"something more than an informal interview with an administrative au-
98. Id. at 334-35.
99. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-84 (1975); Henson v. Honor Comm., 719
F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983).
100. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
101. Id. at 582.
102. Id. at 584.
103. Id., quoted in Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 9 (8th Cir. 1975).
104. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); see supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
105. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 152 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied.,
368 U.S. 930 (1961). Plaintiffs, who were black, were expelled from Alabama State Col-
lege, because they requested service at a white lunch counter in violation of Alabama law,
and they participated in several mass demonstrations.




thority" is required, due to the possible bias of witnesses and the factual
nature of the injury.10 8 Although a "full-dress judicial hearing" is not
always required and may not be desirable, the court stated that a hearing
which allows the college authorities a chance to hear "both sides in con-
siderable detail" would protect the rights of the individuals concerned.
The Dixon court further stated that "the rudiments of an adversary pro-
ceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon the interests of the
college."' 0 9
While courts, in applying due process protections to honor code
proceedings, will require adequate notice and a hearing prior to student
dismissal, they remain split on the issue of the right to representation in
student disciplinary proceedings."I 0 In Henson v. Honor Committee of the
University of Virginia," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit noted that the right to have a student lawyer represent an
accused student at all critical stages of the honor code proceedings was
among the "impressive array of procedural protections" that a univer-
sity could afford its students. 1 2 Although other cases have held to the
contrary, 13 to allow a student accused of cheating the benefit of counsel
in formal honor code proceedings would not only offer the student pro-
tection, but it would also protect the school from lawsuits contesting the
outcome of each case on the ground that the particular honor code hear-
ing in question was fundamentally unfair, and therefore, in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. As Justice Jackson warned:
Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable es-
sence of liberty .... Let it not be overlooked that due process
of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best
insurance ... against those blunders which leave lasting stains
on a system ofjustice .... The most scrupulous observance of
due process include[s] the right to know a charge, to be con-
fronted with the accuser, to cross-examine informers and to
108. Id.
109. Id. at 158-59; see also Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 625 (10th
Cir.) (due process satisfied where there "was an adequate hearing on the charge with a
meaningful opportunity given to plaintiff to participate, to present his position, and to
hear the witnesses presenting the facts they had knowledge of"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898
(1975); Jones v. Snead, 431 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 1970)("[P]rocedural due process
must be afforded a student on the college campus 'by way of adequate notice, definite
charge, and a hearing with opportunity to present one's own side of the case and with all
necessary protective measures.' " (quoting Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d
1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969))), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
110. See, e.g., Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972)(due process clause re-
quires representation by counsel at suspension hearings); Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967)(due process clause allows for representation
by counsel at a suspension hearing), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 965 (1970). But see Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967)(no right to
counsel at conference relating to the suspension of a student), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028
(1968); Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Pa. 1977)(due process does not require
the presence of an attorney at a formal hearing on disciplinary transfers).
111. 719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983).
112. Id. at 73.
113. See Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1028 (1968); Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp 397 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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produce evidence in one's behalf. . . . 14
A student accused of violating a school's honor code should be al-
lowed to have a spokesman represent him in honor code proceedings.
While representation at honor code hearings protects both the student
and the university, it has not been held mandatory to satisfy due process
goals of fundamental fairness.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court and various lower courts have provided a vari-
ety of legal theories and precedents upon which the judiciary can find
private colleges and universities subject to the due process strictures of
the fourteenth amendment. In the past, the courts were loathe to enter
the domain of academia, preferring instead to defer to academicians and
school administrators in both academic and disciplinary cases. With the
expanding application of the fourteenth amendment to private enter-
prises and institutions, the courts began providing a necessary check on
the disciplinary proceedings of private colleges and universities. At the
insistence of the Supreme Court, however, the lower courts have contin-
ued to defer to the judgments of the schools in cases of academic
dismissals.
Given, then, the growing willingness of the courts to hold private
institutions accountable to the fourteenth amendment's due process re-
quirement and the courts' increased willingness to review the discipli-
nary proceedings and judgments of colleges and universities, it seems
logical that the honor code judgments and proceedings of private col-
leges and universities will fall within the purview of the courts. Stu-
dents, subject to the power of one of these institutions, ask no more
than fair treatment and a right to due process in honor code proceed-
ings for alleged disciplinary violations. The requisite amount of due
process should include adequate notice and an opportunity for a reason-
able hearing prior to a student's dismissal. Although it is not mandatory
for the proper execution of the due process ideal, it is preferable to ac-
cord students the right to representation in honor code proceedings. In
effect, then, the application of the due process standards of the four-
teenth amendment to the honor code proceedings of private colleges
and universities would do no more than apply the spirit of the Constitu-
tion to institutions that most directly affect the lives of students. Thus,
from a student's perspective, this goal seems nothing less than
reasonable.
114. Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1953).
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